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RECIPROCAL TRUSTS AND THE FEDERAL ESTATE
TAX: ECONOMIC REALITY DISREGARDED
A SIGNIFICANT PORTION of the Federal Estate Tax is designed to pre-
vent its avoidance.' The necessity for these detailed precautionary
measures becomes apparent from an inspection of some of the ingenious
devices which have been employed to escape its incidence.2 At least
one such device, the reciprocal trust transfer,3 seems to have survived
the stop-gap efforts of Congress and the courts.
The technical basis of the reciprocal trust doctrine was recently con-
sidered in Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner.4 There, John J. New-
berry and his wife, Myrtle, had each created four trusts principally for
the benefit of their two children. Each grantor had conveyed the same
amount of property to the trusts, and had vested in his or her spouse
the same limited power to alter them, although neither grantor had
reserved any powers over the trust which he or she had created. Upon
the death of Myrtle Newberry, the commissioner included in her gross
estate the value of the trusts which had been created by her husband.
The Tax Court affirmed, agreeing that, in practical effect, her powers
over the trusts which her husband had created were equivalent to
powers over her own trusts, and hence were taxable under section
8II(d)(2) of the 1939 Code.5 The Court of Appeals, however, re-
1 The controlling theory of the Estate Tax is that it is a levy upon the privilege of
transferring property at death. However, many of the substantive provisions com-
prising the Tax are concerned with inter vivos transfers. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2035 (transfers in contemplation of death), § 2036 (transfers with a retained life
estate), § 2037 (transfers taking effect at death), § 2038 (revocable transfers). See
generally HUcHES, FEDERAL DEATH TAX 114 (1938).
See generally Leapheart, The Use of the Trust to Escape the Imposition of the
Federal Income and Estate Taxes, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 587 (1930) 5 Lowndes, Tax
A4voidance and the Federal Estate Tax, 7 LmW & CONTEMP. PROB. 309 (.94.); PAUL,
STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION: TAXATION WITHOUT MISREPRESENTATION 27 et.
seq. (1937).
: This has also been characterized as the "cross," "converse," and "parallel,, trust
transfer. See generally Colgan and Molloy, Converse Trusts, the Rise and Fall of a
Tax Avoidance Device, 3 Tax L. Rev. 271 (1948).
'201 F.2d 874 ( 3 d Cir. 1953).
17 T.C. 597, 6o6 (.951). The court said, "The essential consideration here is
that, if the power to change the beneficiaries had been reserved in decedent's own trust,
there would be no doubt that it would fall under section 8i1(d)(2) and, therefore,
the trust corpus fall within the gross estate5 and the result is the same if there are no
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versed, reasoning that since the trusts had not been created in considera-
tion for each other, the wife's powers over the husband's trusts did not
render them taxable to her.'
Had the powers of alteration not been crossed--i.e., had each re-
served to himself the powers over the trust which he or she created-
without doubt the corpus would have been taxable to the grantor's es-
tate.7 Accordingly, the instant decision is difficult to justify rationally.
It is supported, however, by a long line of decisions, beginning with
Lehman v. Commissioner' in 194o. In that case, both Allan and Har-
old Lehman simultaneously created substantially identical trusts giving
the other a life estate and a limited power to invade the corpus. When
Harold died, the commissioner included in his gross estate the sum
which he had been empowered to withdraw from the corpus of the
trusts created by Allan.' The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed' ° on the
ground that the decedent's power to invade the corpus of Allan's trusts
was equivalent to a power to invade his own, and that it was thus an
interest in property of which the decedent had "made a transfer ...
where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to a
change through the exercise of a power ... to alter, amend, or revoke
cross trusts, exchanging the same power so that there is in substance a transfer by the
decedent."
8 2ox F.zd 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1953).
7INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038(a) (z) taxes property of a decedent:
"To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, where the
enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change
through the exercise of a power either by the decedent alone or in conjunc-
tion with any other person, to alter, amend, revoke, or where the decedent
relinquished any such power in contemplation of his death .... "
8 109 F.zd 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940). This was not
the first tax case involving crossed trusts. It was, however, the first case in which a tax
rationale for reciprocal trusts was articulated, and it has since been followed in the
majority of cases involving crossed trusts. See, e.g., Hanauer's Estate v. Comm'r, 149
F.zd 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 3z6 U.S. 770 (1945) ; Cole's Estate v. Comm'r,
14o F.zd 638 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Orvis v. Higgins, iSo F.zd 537 (2d Cir. 195o), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 81o (195o) ; In re Leuder's Estate, 6 T.C. 587 (1946), rev'd on other
grounds, 164 F.zd x8 (3 d Cir. 1947); Estate of Frederick H. Fish, 45 B.T.A. 120
(i94i) 5 cf. Parshelsky v. Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 456 (194z). But cf. Comm'r v. Dravo,
ii9 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1941 ) .
O The Commissioner did not include the entire amount of the property in the de-
cedent's gross estate, as would be the case today where there is a reservation of a life
estate in the grantor [see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036], as the trusts involved in
this case were created prior to 1931 and hence fall under the rule of May v. Heiner,
aS U.S. 238 (1930). See note 32 infra.
"'Allan S. Lehman et al., Ex'rs, 39 B.T.A. 17 (-939).
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, . ,"" taxable under section 302(d) of the 1926 Act.' 2 The Court
of Appeals affirmed,' 3 but for substantially different reasons. Relying
on the settled rule of trust law that "the person who furnishes the con-
sideration for a trust is the settlor even though in form the trust was
created by another person," 4 the court held that Harold was the "true
settlor" of the trusts of which Allan was the named settlor, and to the
extent that Harold could invade the corpus of the trusts of which he
was the "true settlor," they were includable in his gross estate.' 5
It is not apparent why the court substituted its quid pro quo ra-
tionale for the approach of economic equivalence followed by the
Board of Tax Appeals. Nevertheless, that substitution has had pro-
found effect upon subsequent reciprocal trust cases, for it has made the
earmark of taxability one of subjective intent rather than of economic
consequences1--and this area of subjective intent, nebulous in any
context, is especially fraught with difficulties in applying the Estate
Tax.'7 Usually, the transfer has occurred years before the matter
reaches litigation, the party whose intent is in issue is dead, and surviv-
ing parties who would be best qualified to testify concerning the intent
of the decedent are frequently either scattered or dead, or their testi-
mony is of little probative value because of obvious self-interest. The
problem is further aggravated by the fact that in the peculiar cir-
cumstances surrounding the creation of typical reciprocal trusts, it is
quite probable that no dearly defined intent may be discernible. There-
fore, courts have been forced to infer this intent largely from objective
"Id. at 27.
12This section, as amended, now appears as INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 2038(a).
12 2o9 F.2d 99 (2940), cert. denied, 31o U.S. 637 (1940).
i Scor, TRUSTS § 156.3 (1939).
1" Perhaps one reason why the court was prone to adopt this particular rationale
is that it was made easy by a stipulation of counsel before the Board of Tax Appeals
that the trusts were created in consideration for one another. 39 B.T.A. I7, 20 (1939).
This may be cited as an easy case that made bad law, because very few cases have arisen
since the Lehman decision in which this unfortunate stipulation has been made. But cf.
Estate of Thomas Neal, P-H 1943 TC MEM. DEC. 43,518 (1943) i Estate of Olive
H. Oliver, P-H x944 TC MEM. DEC. 44,138 (1944).
16 The vast majority of cases which have arisen subsequent to the Lehman case have
either followed or have been forced to distinguish the subjective approach of mutual
consideration for which that case stands. See, e.g., Orvis v. Higgins, 18o F.ad 537 (2d
Cir. 195o), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 81o (i95o) ; Hanauer's Estate v. Comm'r, 149 F.2d
857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 770 (1945) ; Estate of John H. Eckhardt,
5 T.C. 673 (1945) 5 cf. Parshelsky v. Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 456 (i942), rev'd on other
grounds, 135 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1943) (involves the Federal Income Tax, but the
analysis as to reciprocal trusts is applicable in Estate Tax cases). But cf. Estate of
Samuel S. Lindsay, 2 T.C. 174 (945).
" See Colgan and Molloy, op. cit. supra note 3, at 276 et. seq.
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data and circumstances surrounding the transfer,"' the most significant
of which would seem to be the fact that the trusts arose out of a close
family relationship."9 Other facts which have supported inferences of
reciprocity have been the proximity of times of creation,2 ° the identity
of trustees and legal advisors to the respective grantors,"' the similarity
of trust instruments22 and of subsequent amendatory action, 23 and the
correspondence in amounts of the respective trusts; 24 and although no
one of these factors is generally held to control the question, their
cumulative effect has been considerable. 2' But in spite of the aid of
such objective indicia, this subjective test remains a tenuous one, con-
ducive of numerous difficulties.2"
' Compare Estate of John H. Eckhardt, 5 T.C. 673 (1945) with In re Leuder's
Estate, 6 T.C. 587 (x946), ree'd, 164 F.zd iz8 (3d Cir. '94').
" No cases have been found involving reciprocal transfers which have not been
carried out between close family relations. Arrangements between husband and wife
predominate. E.g., Hanauer's Estate v. Comm'r, 149 F.zd 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 770 (945) ; Cole's Estate v. Comm'r, 14o F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944) ;
Estate of John H. Eckhardt, 5 T.C. 673 (94.5); Estate of Frederick H. Fish, 45
B.T.A. i2o (i94i). Father and daughter: e.g., Estate of George W. Sweeney, 4 T.C.
265 (944), aff'd sub nom. Merganthaler v. Comm'r, 152 F.zd 102 (2d Cir. 1945).
Mother and son: e.g., Claire G. Hoffman, 2 T.C. 116o (1943), aft'd, 148 F.2d 285
( 9 th Cir. 1945). Brothers: e.g., Estate of H. H. Scholler, 44 B.T.A. 235 (194t)
Comm'r v. Warner, 127 F.2d 913 ( 9th Cir. 1942); Lehman v. Comm'r, 1o9 F.2d
99 (-939), cert. denied, 3o U.S. 637 (940); Parshelsky v. Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 456
(i942), rev'd on other grounds, 135 F.2d 596 (ad Cir. 1943).
" See, e.g., Hanauer's Estate v. Commr, 149 F.zd 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 770 (1945) ; In re Leuder's Estate, 6 T.C. 587 (1946), revd, 164
F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
2' See, e.g., Hanauer's Estate v. Comm'r, supra note 20; Estate of John H. Eckhardt,
s T.C. 673 0945) 5 Comm'r v. Warner, 127 F.ad 913 (9th Cir. 194z).
"See, e.g., Allan S. Lehman et at., Ex'rs, 39 B.T.A. 17 (1939), aff'd, io9 F.2d
99 (zd Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 3o U.S. 637 (1940).
"Estate of Myrtle H. Newberry, 5 T.C. 597, 6oo (1951). Although the Tax Court
considered the amendments significant, the Court of Appeals apparently felt that they
did not bear upon the essential issue of consideration. See 2o F.ad 874, 876 ( 3 d Cir.
1953).
'" See, e.g., Estate of John H. Eckhardt, s T.C. 673 (194.5) Werner A. Weiboldt,
5 T.C. 946 (1945); Estate of Henry S. Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943); Bishop v.
Comm'r, 4 T.C. 862 (i945).
25See, e.g., Estate of John H. Eckhardt, 5 T.C. 673 (1945). But cf. Estate of
Samuel S. Lindsay, 2 T.C. 174, 178-79 (1943), where the court said:
"But the facts that the trusts were executed at the same time, were in
substantially equal amounts, and had similar provisions are not conclusive
that the trusts were interdependent and were executed in consideration for
each other."
" This has long been the experience of the courts which have dealt with transfers
in contemplation of death under what is now § 2035 of the 1954 Internal Rev-
enue Code, the wording of which makes a subjective inquiry practically unavoidable.
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In view of the demonstrated inadequacy of the quid pro quo ra-
tionale as an impediment to tax avoidance, the question arises whether
such a treatment is necessary to preserve the integrity of the Estate
Tax. The general climate set by the more recent cases seems to indicate
that it is not.27 Helvering v. Clifford28 is illustrative here. The crux
of the decision to tax the grantor of the trust in that case was the fact
that he had not changed his economic position by reason of the trans-
fer.29 There is no apparent reason why such an enlightened view should
not be adopted in cases involving reciprocal trusts. The fact that the
transferor's economic position has not been changed by the creation of
the trusts would seem sufficient to justify subjecting him to the pro-
visions of the Estate Tax governing inter vivos transfers30 Such an
approach has gained the approval of the courts in numerous cases in-
volving the constitutionality of federal tax measures,3 ' and surely it
could appropriately be applied in this instance.3
In at least four cases involving reciprocal trusts, the courts have
found the consideration rationale either inadequate or illusory and
have deviated from the supposed technical confines of the Lehnn
doctrine. In Werner A. Weiboldt,33 an income tax case,34 there was
For a discussion of the difficulties involved in such a subjective inquiry see the dissent-
ing opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 332 (193-) 5 -
PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 279 et seg. (1942) i Lowndes and Rut-
ledge, An Objective Test of Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 24. TEXAs L. REV.
13+ (1946).
2 For an excellent summary of the treatment of cases since Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.s. 331 (940), with emphasis upon the "new" concept of economic reality in
federal taxation, see Goldring, The Taxation of Economic Control, 2+ TAXEs 751
(1946).
28 309 U.S. 331 (194o). For a compendium of the articles which have commented
upon the Clifford doctrine, see 6 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 3 7 .x7 (b) n. 55 (revised ed. 1949).
29 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 336 (1940).
0 See note i supra.
This so-called "penumbra" doctrine, stated simply, is that if the federal govern-
ment has the undisputed power to tax transfers of property at death, then, a fortiori,
it may tax inter vivos transfers which, unless so taxed, would escape taxation. See Hel-
vering v. City Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935); Lowndes, Current Constitu*-
tional Problems in Federal Taxation, 4 VAND. L. REV. 469, 486 et. seq. (1951).
"Unfortunate situations have resulted in the past when courts have refused to
give the Estate Tax the liberal construction which the purpose of the tax would seem to
dictate. The prime example is May v. Heiner, zS, U.S. 238 (1930), where it was
held that the reservation of a life estate was not taxable as a transfer "taking effect at
death," because, under property concepts, the remainder vested at the time of the
transfer.
5 T.C. 946 (945).
" There is no significant difference between the considerations involved in the re-
ciprocal trust situation under the estate and income taxes. See Colgan and Molloy, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 287.
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a finding that the petitioners, in establishing the trusts, did not consider
that they were being created in consideration for one another,"" but the
court nevertheless held that they were taxable to the respective grantors,
noting that "we are constrained to concern ourselves with the realities
of the situation and not with mere form."3 A similar emphasis was
placed upon the practical results of the transfer in Bishop v. Cor-
missioner,37 also an income tax case, where the court held that transfers
were not "gifts" as defined by the statute when each grantor reserved a
life estate to the other, because "in the establishment of these trusts
petitioners have received from each other all the incidents of ownership
that were of importance to them."3" Likewise, in Estate of Frederick
H. Fish,3" arising under the Estate Tax, the court paid lip service to
the Lehman decision, but the truly pertinent language of the opinion
evinced a more realistic approach: ". . . The rights each received under
the trust created by the other were of the unrestricted character not
essentially to be distinguished from complete ownership."40 And per-
haps the most candid departure from the Lehman rationale which has
arisen under the Estate Tax is Coles Estate v. Com4issioner,4' where
the court found consideration, but stated unequivocally that the tax
results would have been the same without such a finding, because the
law attaches consequences to what the parties do, regardless of their
private intentions.42
Although these cases may, to some extent, have impaired its vitality,
the quid pro quo rationale persists as a constant threat to the adminis-
tration of the Estate Tax. This is dramatically illustrated by the New-
"Werner A. Weiboldt, 5 T.C. 946, 95o , 951 (s945)-
"Id. at 953- In support of this proposition, the court also cited Helvering v.
Clifford, and clarified its view of the case by saying:
"If either grantor had retained such power [as was exchanged here], he
would have been subject to tax on the income under Stockstrom v. Com-
missioner, 148 F.zd 491 [1945]. Certainly the effect of that case may not be
circumvented by a simple expedient on the part of a husband and wife of
exchanging the rights with each other."
374 T.C. 86z (1945).
"Id. at 869, 870. In so holding, the court found it unnecessary to consider the
doctrine of reciprocal trusts.
3945 B.T.A. izo (i94i).
491d. at 125. 41 14o F.zd 636 (8th Cir. 1944).
"
1Id. at 638. The exact wording of the opinion is perhaps more revealing here:
"Assuming, arguendo, that no specific finding of consideration was made,
the court's decision may be sustained on another basis. . . . [A]s a result of
the identical and simultaneous trusts, and of the 'family relationships,' each
decedent 'retained the substance of full enjoyment of all the rights [for
life] which previously he had in the property.' . . . Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.s. 331, 336 [1940]. . . . To the extent of the income from the 300
shares of the stock there was no change in the economic position of either
grantor."
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berry case. There every evidentiary fact, save one, pointed unequivo-
cally to a carefully worked out scheme to avoid taxation.43 The only
evidence which tended to contradict interdependency was the testimony
of the husband that Myrtle Newberry had indicated to him that she
would have created her trusts even if he had not created his, because she
was impressed by the soundness of the disposition.44 Nevertheless, the
court held that the trusts were not created in exchange for one another.
Had the court been unfettered by the impressive authority supporting
the Lehman rationale,45 it might have decided the case differently, and
Judge Hastie would not have felt constrained to admit:
Undoubtedly, in this connection as in others, domestic privacy and
informality may effectively conceal understandings made and hon-
ored between husband and wife at variance with formal and appar-
ent aspects of family financial transactions. A bargain and ex-
change, within the meaning of the Lehman doctrine, may exist,
yet be unprovable.40
In the present state of the law, it is difficult to determine which ap-
proach a given court is likely to follow, but it is dear that the proper
one is a repudiation of the Lehman doctrine of subjective intent in
favor of a more objective test. Such a course is constitutionally sound547
it is accurate as an interpretation of the estate tax;48 and it provides a
definite standard by which tax results may be determined and pre-
dicted.49
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"What is probably most significant is that the timing conclusively suggests that the
trusts were amended for the sole purpose of keeping abreast of changes in the In-
ternal Revenue Code and thus maintaining the tax-free character of the transfers. In
reviewing the evidence on appeal, Judge Hastie, speaking for the court, concluded that
"we have no doubt that the parties, adv'sed by counsel, deliberately chose the alterna-
tive which appeared to entail the less burdensome tax consequences." 2oi F.zd 874, 878(3d Cir. 1953).
"Newberry's Estate v. Comm'r, 2o F.2d 874, 875 (3 d Cir. 1953).
"Perhaps it should be pointed out that what Judge Hastie and many others have
conceived to be the strict limitations of the Lehman case are actually nonexistent. Absent
the stipulated case of mutual consideration, it is arguable that the court would not
have adopted the ground of decision followed by the Tax Court. See note 15 supra.
so 2oi F.zd 874, 878 ( 3 d Cir. 1953).
"' Cf. Helvering v. City Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935) 5 Cole's Estate v.
Comm'r, 140 F.zd 636 (8th Cir. x944).
"See, e.g., Cole's Estate v. Comm'r, supra note 47.
,It should be noted that, since the Newberry case, at least one court has rejected the
suggested approach. In McLain v. Comm'r, z26 F. Supp. 6z, 625 (N.D. Ill. 1955),
the court, specifically adopting the Newberry rationale, concluded that "since the
stipulated facts are barren of any reference to any consideration . . . the two trusts
created simultaneously by the decedent and his wife are not reciprocal within the doc-
trine first announced in Lehman v. Commissioner."
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